Abstract. We present deductive systems for various modal logics that can be obtained from the constructive variant of the normal modal logic CK by adding combinations of the axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5. This includes the constructive variants of the standard modal logics K4, S4, and S5. We use for our presentation the formalism of nested sequents and give a syntactic proof of cut elimination.
Introduction
The modal logic K is obtained from classical propositional logic by incorporating two unary operators, or modalities, and ♦, and adding the k-axiom, (A ⊃ B) ⊃ ( A ⊃ B), to dictate the interaction between the modalities and propositional connectives. The behavior of the ♦ modality is then determined by enforcing that it is the De Morgan dual of . Along with this axiom there is the necessitation rule, saying that if A is a theorem of K then so is A. Informally, is often interpreted as "necessarily" and ♦ as "possibly". Notice that interaction with other propositional connectives is determined by the adequacy of {⊃, ⊥} in classical logic.
In the intuitionistic setting, however, one must define the behavior of and ♦ independently, in the absence of De Morgan duality. Consequently, it is not enough to just add the standard k-axiom, which makes no mention of the ♦-modality, and so some classical consequences of k must be added to formulate an intuitionistic version of K. To this end there seems to be no canonical choice, and many different intuitionistic versions of K have been proposed, e.g., [Fit48, Pra65, Ser84, PS86, Sim94, BdP00, PD01] (for a survey see [Sim94] ). However, in the current literature, two variants prevail; the first, known as intuitionistic K, adds the following five axioms, along with the necessitation rule, to intuitionistic propositional logic: It was originally proposed in [Ser84, PS86] and studied in detail in [Sim94] ; more recent work can be found in [GS10, Str13, MS14a] .
The second variant, known as constructive K, includes only k 1 and k 2 , not k 3 , k 4 , k 5 . This choice of axioms dates back to [Pra65] 1 , and its proof theory was investigated, for example, in [BdP00, HP07, MS11] , while the semantics of it and some extensions was studied in [FM97] and [Koj12] .
To gain intuition about the difference between the two variants, let us have a look at their standard Kripke semantics. A model of intuitionistic modal logic is described by a 4-tuple (W, ≤, R, I) with • a non-empty set of possible worlds W , preordered by ≤.
• an accessibility relation R ⊆ W × W satisfying:
(i) For any w, v, v ′ ∈ W , if wRv and v ≤ v ′ , there exists a w ′ ∈ W such that w ≤ w ′ and w ′ Rv ′ . (ii) For any w, w ′ , v ∈ W , if w ≤ w ′ and wRv, there exists a v ′ ∈ W such that w ′ Rv ′ and v ≤ v ′ .
• a function I : W → 2 A , where A = {a, b, c, . . .} denotes the set of propositional letters, such that for any w, w ′ ∈ W , if w ≤ w ′ then I(w) ⊆ I(w ′ ). Note that (i) and (ii) ensure a form of monotonicity of R over ≤. In contrast, a model of constructive modal logic decouples the accessibility relation R from ≤. It assumes a set of 'fallible' worlds⊥ as a subset of W ; such that⊥ is closed under ≤ and R, i.e. whenever w ∈⊥ and wRw 1 or w ≤ w 1 we also have w 1 ∈⊥. This is much weaker a condition on R than (i) and (ii) . Also the definition of the forcing relation |= shows subtle differences. For the atoms, the binary connectives and the -modality, the intuitionistic and constructive semantics definition coincide:
• w |= a iff a ∈ I(w).
• w |= A ∧ B iff w |= A and w |= B.
• w |= A ∨ B iff w |= A or w |= B.
• w |= A ⊃ B iff ∀w ′ ∈ W. w ≤ w ′ and w ′ |= A imply w ′ |= B.
• w |= A iff ∀w ′ , v ′ ∈ W. w ≤ w ′ and w ′ Rv ′ imply v ′ |= A. In the intuitionistic case, forcing for ♦ and ⊥ is defined as follows:
• w |= A iff ∃v ∈ W. wRv and v |= A.
• w |= ⊥. Whereas in the constructive case we have:
• w |= A iff ∀w ′ ∈ W. if w ≤ w ′ then ∃v ′ ∈ W. w ′ Rv ′ and v ′ |= A.
• w |= ⊥ iff w ∈⊥.
• w |= A if w ∈⊥. We can now see that there is a countermodel to each of k 3 , k 4 , k 5 in the constructive setting:
• k 3 : W = {w 0 , w 1 , u 0 , v 1 }, w 0 ≤ w 1 , w 0 Ru 0 , w 1 Rv 1 , I(w 0 ) = I(w 1 ) = ∅, I(u 0 ) = a 1 , I(v 1 ) = a 2 . We have w 0 |= ♦(a 1 ∨ a 2 ) and w 0 |= ♦a 1 ∨ ♦a 2 .
• k 4 : W = {w 0 , w 1 , u 0 , u 1 }, w 0 ≤ w 1 , u 0 ≤ u 1 , w 0 Ru 0 , I(w 0 ) = I(w 1 ) = ∅, I(u 0 ) = {a 2 }, I(u 1 ) = {a 1 , a 2 }. We have w 0 |= ♦a 1 ⊃ a 2 and w 0 |= (a 1 ⊃ a 2 ).
• k 5 : W = {w 0 , u 0 }, w 0 Ru 0 , I(w 0 ) = ∅, u 0 ∈⊥. We have w 0 |= ♦⊥ and w 0 |= ⊥. 1 We point out that some versions of K intermediate to these two variants have also been considered, for example the variant with k1, k2, and k5 in [Wij90] . Notice that the countermodels for k 3 and k 4 could not exist in the presence of (i) and (ii) above, and the countermodel for k 5 relies on the availability of the set⊥ of fallible worlds.
We refer the reader to [MS11] for a more thorough semantic analysis of the differences between intuitionistic K and constructive K.
This work is concerned with the proof theory of constructive K, denoted CK and its various extensions with other common modal axioms. As for the classical and intuitionistic variants, we consider the five axioms below: A priori, this gives us 32 different logics, but as in classical (or intuitionistic) modal logic some of them coincide, so that we obtain only 15 distinct logics.
2 These are depicted in Figure 1 , where we use the same names as those standard in the classical setting [Gar08] , prefixed by 'C'.
While the proof theory of the intuitionistic version of this cube has been well-studied in labeled systems [Sim94] and non-labeled systems [GS10, Str13, MS14a] , there is surprisingly little work on the constructive "modal cube". In fact, to our knowledge, only the logics CK, CT, CK4, and CS4 have received proof theoretic treatment so far, e.g. in [BdP00, HP07, MS11] .
In this work we attempt to give a unified cut-elimination procedure for all logics in Figure 1 , using the framework of nested sequents [Kas94, GPT09, Brü09, Str13, Fit14] , a generalization of Gentzen's sequent calculus which allows sequents to occur within sequents. This approach has previously been successful for the classical modal cube in [Brü09] and the intuitionistic modal cube in [Str13] but, perhaps surprisingly, the step from intuitionistic to constructive appears more involved than the one from classical to intuitionistic. This is also the reason why, in this paper, we consider only the logics in the 'cube'. We would like to compare the intuitionistic and constructive cases from the point of view of cut-elimination. Whenever possible, we aim to point out the differences to the arguments for intuitionistic systems presented in [Str13] .
While the cut-elimination proofs in [Brü09] and [Str13] are markedly similar, we seem to require a different method in the constructive setting. The reasons for this are that certain formulations of some logical rules are no longer sound, and that we need an explicit contraction rule, along with other structural rules that further complicate the process of cut-elimination.
Nonetheless we manage to obtain cut-elimination for the logics CK, CK4, CK45, CD, CD4, CD45, CT, CS4, and CS5, and we conjecture that our systems admit cut for all logics in the cube.
We are not aware of a similar uniform treatment of constructive modal logics within other formalisms. However, in hindsight it is straightforward to translate our results into prefixed tableaux, using [Fit12] , or into a tree-labeled sequent calculus.
We point out an interesting observation that the b-axiom entails k 3 and k 5 . While this is likely already known to many in the community we could not find this result stated in the literature, and so it is pertinent to raise it here. This arguably questions the "constructiveness" of logics including b, and so the inclusion of such logics in the cube itself, but such considerations are beyond the scope of this work.
3
Several attempts to deal with the proof theory of constructive modal logic have appeared previously. However, the fundamental data structures of such calculi all seem to be special cases of nested sequents. For example, the 2-sequents of [Mas92, Mas93] are a form of nested sequent where no tree-branching is allowed. It is not clear how the 2-sequent approach, while successful for deontic logic, could be adapted for the various constructive logics, or even CK, as pointed out by Wansing in [Wan94] . Also the sequents of [MS11, MS14b] can be seen as a special case of nested sequents, also where no tree-branching is allowed, but constituting a richer data structure than 2-sequents because of the inclusion of a 'focus'.
Regarding applications of the family of the constructive modal logics, the extended Curry-Howard correspondence (which, for modal logics, is a relatively recent investigation) has been studied for CS4 [AMdPR01, MS14b] . The constructive operator here captures staged computation [DP96, aBMTS99] , and such logics are also used for the study of contexts [MdP05, MS14b] . We also point out that there are many logics of interest that are proper extensions of CK but not of intuitionistic K, e.g. CS4 and PLL; a more detailed discussion of such logics can be found in [FM97] .
Preliminaries on Nested Sequents
In order to present a nested sequent system for CK, we first need to define the notion of a nested sequent structure. For this, we recall the basic notions from [Str13] , with slight modifications in notation, tailored to the current setting. Let a, b, c, . . . denote propositional variables and define formulas A, B, C, . . . of constructive modal logic by the following grammar:
As shorthand we write ⊤ for ⊥ ⊃ ⊥ and we omit parentheses whenever it is not ambiguous.
A (nested) sequent is a tree whose nodes are multisets of formulas tagged with a polarity. There are two polarities, input (intuitively as if on the left of the turnstile in the conventional sequent calculus), denoted by a • superscript, and output (intuitively as if on the right of the turnstile in the conventional sequent calculus), denoted by a • superscript. Formally we define LHS sequents, denoted Φ, and RHS sequents, denoted Ψ, as follows,
and a full sequent is a structure of the form Φ, Ψ. We assume that associativity and commutativity of the comma ',' is implicit in our systems, and that ∅ acts as its unit. This definition entails that exactly one formula in a full sequent has output polarity, and all others have input polarity. We use capital Greek letters Γ, ∆, Σ, . . . to denote arbitrary sequents, LHS, RHS or full, and may decorate them with a • or • superscript to indicate that they are LHS or RHS, respectively.
The corresponding formula of a sequent is defined inductively as follows,
A context, denoted by Γ{ }, is a sequent with a hole { } taking the place of a subsequent (or, equivalently, a formula); Γ{∆} is the sequent obtained from Γ{ } by replacing the occurrence of { } by ∆. Note that, for this to form a full sequent, Γ{ } and ∆ must have the correct format. We distinguish two kinds of contexts: an output context is one that results in a full sequent when its hole is filled with a RHS sequent, and an input context analogously for a LHS sequent. This is clarified by the following example, taken from [Str13] .
. Then Γ 1 {∆ 2 } and Γ 2 {∆ 1 } are not well-formed full sequents, because the former would contain no output formula, and the latter would contain two. However, we can form the full sequents,
whose corresponding formulas, respectively, are:
Observation 2.2. Every output context Γ{ } is of the shape,
for some n ≥ 0. Filling the hole of an output context with a RHS or full sequent yields a full sequent, and filling it with a LHS sequent yields a LHS sequent. Every input context Γ{ } is of the shape,
3) where Γ ′ { } and Λ{ } are output contexts (i.e., are of the shape (2.2) above). Note that Γ ′ { } and Λ{ } and Π are uniquely determined by the position of the hole { } in Γ{ }.
We can choose to fill the hole of a context Γ{ } with nothing, denoted by Γ{∅}, which means we simply remove the occurrence of { }. In Example 2.1 above,
is a full sequent. More generally, whenever Γ{∅} is a full sequent, then Γ{ } is an input context. Definition 2.3. For every input context Γ{ } = Γ ′ {Λ{ }, Π • }, we define its output pruning Γ ⇓ { } to be the context Γ ′ {Λ{ }}, i.e., the same context with the subtree containing the unique output formula and sharing the same root as { } removed. Thus, Γ ⇓ { } is an output context. In Example 2.1 above, Γ
Nested Sequent Systems for CK and its Variants
We use the standard notions of inference rule and derivation (or proof ) from usual sequent calculi; all that changes is the notion of sequent, as introduced in the previous section. We insist that every sequent in a derivation is a full sequent.
4 A proof of a formula A is then a derivation whose conclusion is the (full) sequent A • . We also use the standard notions of admissibility and derivability of inference rules (see, e.g., [Bus98] or [TS00] ).
Let us now consider the set of inference rules shown in Figure 2 , which we call the system NCK for CK. These rules are similar to the corresponding rules for intuitionistic modal logic in [Str13] and classical modal logic in [Brü09] , although there are some subtle yet crucial differences:
• In [Str13] and [Brü09] additive versions of ⊃ • and • were given rather than incorporating an explicit contraction rule in the system. While these were essentially design choices in the previous works, here it is necessary to make contraction explicit since our treatment of the b-axiom does not allow us to show the admissibility of contraction; this is explained further below. Consequently, our cut-elimination proof differs significantly from the ones in [Str13] and [Brü09] . • The ⊥ • -rule and the ∨ • -rule have a restriction on where the output formula occurs in the context: it must be in the same subtree of the sequent as the principal formula of the rule. The reason for this is the lack of k 3 (for the ∨ • -rule) and k 5 (for the ⊥ • -rule).
• In the ⊃ • -rule (and also in the cut-rule described below), the 'output pruning' is defined differently from [Str13] . There only the unique output formula is removed, whereas here the whole subtree containing the output formula is removed. The reason for this is the lack of the k 4 -axiom.
• In [Str13] the structural rule
is heavily used. However, in the constructive setting, this rule is not available as it is no longer sound: it corresponds to the k 4 -axiom when the output formula occurs in ∆ 1 or ∆ 2 . Note that the id-rule applies only to atomic formulas but, as usual with sequent-style systems, the general form is derivable and this can be shown by a straightforward induction:
In the course of this paper we make use of the following structural rules:
called necessitation, weakening, and cut, respectively. These rules are not part of the system, but we will later see that they are all admissible. Note that in the weakening rule ∆ must be a LHS sequent, as is the case for the contraction rule c, as one might expect in an intuitionistic setting. The cut rule makes use of the output pruning in the same way as the ⊃ • -rule. We now turn to the rules for the axioms in (1.2). For d, t and 4, the corresponding rules are shown in Figure 3 , and they coincide with those in [Str13] .
For the b and 5 axioms, the rules given in [Str13] (themselves adapted from the classical setting [Brü09] ) are not sound in the constructive setting, again due to the lack of k 4 . For b, one could restrict the rules of [Str13] in the following way,
in order to regain soundness. However such a system is not yet complete as, for example, the formula ♦( A ∨ ⊥) ⊃ A is no longer provable in the cut-free system. To address this problem, we introduce the structural rules in Figure 4 which were used during the cut-elimination proofs of [Brü09] and [Str13] . These rules are identical to the ones in [Brü09] and [Str13] for d, t, and b. For 4, our rule is slightly weaker than the one in [Str13] , again due to the lack of k 4 . Finally, for 5, the situation is more subtle: again, the general versions of the logical rules 5 • and 5 • from [Str13] are no longer sound due to the lack of k 4 . These 5 • and 5 • rules can each be decomposed into three rules performing 'simpler' inference steps, but unfortunately all three of these are unsound. The first can be made sound by incorporating weakening, as shown for b • and b • in (3.2) and (3.3) above, but, as expected, the resulting system is again incomplete.
Perhaps surprisingly, the structural rule 5 [ ] used in [Brü09] and [Str13] is also no longer sound in the constructive setting due to the lack of k 4 . However, that rule (shown on the left below 5 ) can also be decomposed into three rules (shown on the right below), of which the first (shown in Figure 4 ) is sound in the constructive setting, i.e. with respect to HCK + 5 in the next section. This 'decomposition' is similar to the cases of the rules 5 • and 5 • discussed in [Str13] and [MS14a] .
Γ{[Σ]}{∅}
In the remainder of this paper we show soundness and completeness of our systems. For this let us introduce the following notation. We use X and Y for sets of axioms, i.e., X, Y ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, and we write
to denote the set of corresponding structural rules shown in Figure 4 . If X ⊆ {d, t, 4}, we write X for the set of corresponding • -and ♦ • -rules shown in Figure 3 . Then, we may write NCK + X + Y [ ] to denote NCK augmented with the rules X and Y [ ] ; in such cases no assumptions on X or Y further to those stated are assumed. In particular, their intersection does not need to be empty, nor does one need to be a subset of the other.
Soundness
To our knowledge there are no standard Kripke semantics for all the various constructive modal logics and consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this work. Therefore we show soundness of our rules with respect to the Hilbert system.
For this we define HCK to be some complete set of axioms for intuitionistic propositional logic extended by the axioms k 1 and k 2 , shown in (1.1), together with the rules mp for modus ponens and nec for necessitation:
For a set X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5} we then write HCK + X for the system obtained from HCK by adding the axioms in X. If X is a singleton {x}, we just write HCK + x. Soundness can now be stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness). Let X ⊆ {d, t, 4}, let Y ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, and let
Clearly, (ii) follows immediately from (i) using an induction on the size of the derivation. To prove (i), we start with the axioms: Proof. By induction on the structure of Γ{ }.
For showing soundness of the inference rules with one premise, we first have to verify that the deep inference reasoning remains valid in the constructive setting. This is shown in the following three lemmas.
Lemma 4.3. Let X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, and let A, B, and C be formulas.
Proof. 
If fm(Σ) ⊃ fm(∆) is provable in HCK + X, then so is fm(Γ{∆}) ⊃ fm(Γ{Σ}).
Proof. As in [Str13] . By Observation 2.2, Γ{ } = Γ ′ {Λ{ }, Π} for some Γ ′ { } and Λ{ } and Π. By induction on Λ{ }, using Lemma 4.3.
(iii) and (v), we get fm(Λ{Σ}) ⊃ fm(Λ{∆}), and from Lemma 4.3.(ii) it then follows that (fm(Λ{∆}) ⊃ fm(Π)) ⊃ (fm(Λ{Σ}) ⊃ fm(Π)).
Now the statement follows from Lemma 4.4.
We can now prove the soundness of rules with one premiss.
Lemma 4.6. Let X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, and let
Proof. Lemma 4.7. Let X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, and let A, B, C, and D be formulas.
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow by completeness of HCK over intuitionistic logic. (iii) and (iv) follow by necessitation, distributivity of over ∧, and k 1 or k 2 respectively.
Lemma 4.8. Let X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, let ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , and Σ be full sequents, and let
Proof. Induction on the structure of Γ{ }, using Lemma 4.7.(i) and (iii).
Lemma 4.9. Let X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, and let
Proof. For the ∧ • -and ∨ • -rules, this follows immediately from Lemma 4.8 and provable
note that by Observation 2.2 and Definition 2.3, the rule is of shape
where Γ ′ { }, Λ{ }, and Π{ } are output contexts. In particular, let
n, and let
To be able to apply Lemma 4.8,
which can be shown provable in HCK + X using an induction on n together with Lemma 4.7.
(ii) and (iv). For the cut-rule we additionally observe that A ⊃ A is always provable.
Remark 4.10. From the lemmas presented so far, we now have that NCK+w+cut is sound with respect to HCK, i.e. we have proved already Theorem 4.1 in the case of X = Y = ∅. This means that if we have a proof of a formula A in NCK + w + cut in which we allow X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5} to occur as proper axioms, then we have that X ⊃ A is provable in HCK, by purely propositional logic, and therefore A is provable in HCK + X.
We use the observation in the above remark to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.11. Let S and D be arbitrary formulas. Then we have the following:
Proof. In the following we show that the formulas in (i)-(vi) can be proved in NCK + cut extended by b or 5, as appropriate, as a proper axiom. Our lemma then follows from Remark 4.10.
(i) 
• where D 1 is a subderivation of (i), D 2 is the same as D 1 , except that we use 5 instead of b, and D 3 is a variant of a subderivation of (ii), using 5 instead of b.
Now we can show soundness of the rules in Figures 3 and 4 , which we need to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.12. Let X ⊆ {d, t, 4}, let Y ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, let x ∈ X, let y ∈ Y, and let Having established the soundness of our system, we can use it to make some interesting observations. Surprisingly, the b-axiom entails the axioms k 3 and k 5 (shown in (1.1) in the 
• 
While the proof of k 5 can be easily shown directly in the Hilbert system, the proof of k 3 in HCK + b is not so simple. From our cut-elimination result in Section 6 it will follow that the 5 axiom alone is not enough to derive k 3 or k 5 . But since b is derivable in CS5, both k 3 or k 5 are derivable in CS5.
Completeness
Completeness is also shown with respect to the Hilbert system. This is in fact very similar to the completeness proof for intuitionistic modal logic given in [Str13] . To simplify our cut-elimination argument in Section 6 we will put a restriction on the ♦ • -rule: we define the system NCK ′ to be NCK with the ♦ • -rule replaced by
Theorem 5.1 (Completeness). Let X ⊆ {d, t, 4} and Y ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}. Then every formula that is provable in
Proof. Clearly, all axioms of propositional intuitionistic logic are provable in NCK ′ . The axioms k 1 and k 2 are provable in NCK ′ , by the same derivations as in [Str13] , so we do not repeat them here. Note that the derivations for k 3 , k 4 , and k 5 of [Str13] are not valid in our setting because of the restrictions to the ∨ • -, ⊃ • -, and ⊥ • -rules, respectively. Figure 5 shows that each axiom x ∈ X ∪ Y is provable in
Finally the rules mp and nec, shown in (4.1), can be simulated by the rules cut and nec [ ] , shown in (3.1), as follows: Thus, if we want a cut-free system for CS4, we have to add the rules {t • , t • , 4 • , 4 • } to NCK ′ . The proof of Theorem 5.2 relies on the cut-elimination argument presented in the next section, and can thus be presented only at the end of Section 6.
Looking back at the cube in Figure 1 , we can see that Theorem 5.2 gives us cut-free systems for the logics CK, CK4, CK45, CD, CD4, CD45, CT, CS4, and CS5. The logics for which our cut-elimination proof does not apply are CKB, CK5, CKB5, CD5, CDB, and CTB.
Cut-Elimination
By inspection of the statement of Theorem 5.2, we have that t and 4 must be present as logical rules, and b and 5 as structural rules, whereas d can be present in either variation. This is due to the following result, whose proof is straightforward. 
However, our cut-elimination argument becomes slightly simpler if we work with d We can now state our cut-elimination result in a concise way:
Theorem 6.3 (Cut-Elimination). Let X, Y be a safe pair of axioms, and let D be a proof in
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 6.3. Since our cut-elimination strategy might seem unorthodox, we first explain some of the problems we encountered. Consider the following derivation: We cannot permute the instance of ∨ • under the cut because in general it is not applicable in
On the other hand, we cannot reduce the rank of the cut along the main connective of the cut formula ♦A, since there is no invertible rule for ♦A • , and different things might happen in the left two branches. Furthermore, we cannot just impose the same restriction that we impose on the ∨ • rule also on the cut rule, because then we would not be able to reduce the cut rank in the ordinary ♦ • -♦ • cases. The situation in (6.1) is the reason we work with the rule♦ • instead of ♦ • . Note that imposing the same restriction on all logical rules would make other permutation cases difficult.
In what follows we will use the shorthand Γ n to denote Γ with n pairs of brackets around it, i.e.
. Also, we define the depth of a context Γ{ } to be the number of bracket pairs in whose scope the hole of Γ{ } appears, i.e., the depth of
We Figure 6 , obtained from unboundedly many applications of the corresponding normal rules in a certain way. For a safe pair X, Y of axioms, we define The other cases are similar.
When the rules 4 • and 4 • are present our cut rule, shown in (3.1), is not strong enough for our induction to work. Therefore we additionally use the following two rules By Cut, we refer to the set {cut, ♦cut, cut} or {cut}, depending on whether 4 • and 4 • are present or not, and we write * cut for any variant in Cut. Throughout this section we fix the convention that, for any * cut step, the output cut formula occurs in the left premise, while the input cut formula occurs in the right premise. Given a cut step, as shown in (3.1), its cut formula is A, and its rank is depth(A).
Since the rules ♦cut and cut can be seen as derivations consisting of one instance of cut and some instances of 4 • and 4 • , respectively, the definition of rank also applies to ♦cut and cut given in (6.2). We use this convention throughout this section: whenever we define a notion for an instance of cut, this definition also applies for ♦cut and cut because there is a unique instance of cut contained in them.
Definition 6.8. The inference rules id,
and s4
• are called black destructing. The principal formula of a black destructing rule instance is the input formula singled out in its conclusion in Figures 2, 3 and 6.
In other words a rule instance is black destructing if, considered bottom-up, it decomposes an input formula along its main connective, and that formula is its principal formula. In particular, note that 4 • and s4 • are not black destructing.
Definition 6.9. An instance of cut is anchored if the rule immediately above it on the right is a black-destructing rule whose principal formula is the cut formula. We define the value of a cut-instance to be the pair r, s , where r is its rank, and s = 0 if it is anchored and s = 1 if it is not anchored. The value of an instance of ♦cut or cut is the value of the underlying cut-instance (if we read the ♦cut/ cut as composition of cut and s4
• /s4 • ). Finally, the cut-value of a derivation D, denoted by v(D) is the multiset of the values of its cut-instances.
We order cut values lexicographically, i.e., r 1 , s 1 < r 2 , s 2 iff r 1 < r 2 or r 1 = r 2 and s 1 < s 2
Then, multisets of cut values are ordered via a common multiset ordering: Given an ordered set V, < , let M(V ) be the set of multisets of elements of V , and let M 1 , M 2 ∈ M(V ) be two such multisets. We define M 1 ≪ M 2 iff there is a multiset surjection f :
Fact 6.10. If < is a strict total order, then so is ≪. Furthermore, if < is well-founded, then so is ≪ [DM79].
Example 6.11. If we let V = N, with the usual ordering, then we have, for example, {1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 5} ≪ {2, 5, 5} and {1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2} ≪ {1, 2, 3}, where in the first case we can map 2 to 2, and 1, 3, 4, 4 all to one 5, and 5 to the other 5. We could also map 1 to 2, and 2, 3, 4, 4 to one 5, and 5 to the other 5. These choices will be associated with reductions in our later cut-elimination arguments.
This gives us a well-order ≪ on the cut-values of a derivation, and our cut-reduction proceeds by an induction on this well-order. For simplicity, we always consider a topmost cut. There are two main lemmas, one for reducing anchored cuts (Lemma 6.20), and one for reducing cuts that are not anchored (Lemma 6.19). For both of these lemmas we need, as is often the case, height preserving admissibility and invertibility of certain inference rules.
Definition 6.12. The height of a derivation D, denoted by h(D), is defined to be the length of a maximal branch in the derivation tree. We say that a rule r with one premise is height preserving admissible in a system S, if for each derivation D in S \ {r} of r's premise there is a derivation D ′ of r's conclusion in S \ {r}. Similarly, a rule r is height preserving invertible in a system S, if for every derivation of the conclusion of r there are derivations for each of r's premises with at most the same height. 
with depth(∆ 2 ) = m and depth(∆ 1 ) = n, and the permutation is as follows: where r is t • if the hole of ∆{ } has depth 0 and s4
One overlap case is similar to case 1, and the other is given below. and we can apply the induction hypothesis twice. (10) s4
One overlap case is similar to 9 and the other is given below. Before we can state our main lemmas, we need to define a restricted version of Buss' logical flow-graphs [Bus91] .
Definition 6.15. We define the (formula) flow-graph of a derivation D, denoted by G(D) to be the directed graph whose vertices are all input formula occurrences in D, and whose edges are just between two formula occurrences which are the same unaltered occurrence in the premise and conclusion of an instance of an inference rule. This concerns all formula occurrences in Γ{ }, ∆, Π, and Σ in the rules in Figures 2, 3 Let us emphasize that there are no edges between a formula occurrence and any of its subformulae that may occur in G(D). For example, the principal A ∨ B • in the conclusion of an ∨ • -rule is connected to neither the A • nor the B • in the premises. But every formula occurrence in Γ{{ }, Π • } in the conclusion is connected via an edge to the same occurrence in each of the two premises. Thus, the flow-graph is essentially a set of trees, where branching occurs in the branching rules ∨ • , ⊃ • , ∧ • , * cut, and in a contraction because every formula occurrence in ∆ • in the conclusion is connected to each of its copies in the premise.
Recall from Definition 6.8 the notion of a black-destructing rule, from Definition 6.9 the notion of an anchored cut, and our convention that an output cut formula is written on the left-hand side of a * cut step and an input cut formula on the right. To be clear, irrelevant cut-paths are exactly those that begin in the context of an axiom, i.e. in the Γ{ } part of a ⊥ • or id step.
Notice that we are using the term 'anchored' to describe both cuts, as in Definition 6.9, and origins as in the definition above (as well as derivations). In particular we point out that, if a cut is anchored, then it can have only one origin which is also anchored. Conversely, if all origins are anchored (which are only defined for relevant cut-paths), there may be some cuts that are not anchored in the derivation, namely those with only irrelevant cut-paths. An anchored derivation, thus, is one all of whose cuts and origins are anchored, which is not the same as simply having all origins anchored. This subtlety is important in the proof of Lemma 6.19 below. But first, let us make an example.
Example 6.17. Consider the derivation: 
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of irrelevant cuts in D. Consider the topmost one. We can replace
where D ′ 2 is obtained from D 2 by removing the A • occurrence everywhere; this results in a correct derivation since, by irrelevance, A • must occur in the context of an axiom. For ♦cut and cut we proceed similarly.
In the following, we use the notation n * r where n is a natural number and r a name of an inference rule. Then n * r simply stands for n consecutive applications of r. Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of origins in G(D) that are not anchored. If all origins are anchored, then we remove all irrelevant cuts using Lemma 6.18 and we are done. Otherwise, we pick a topmost origin that is not anchored and proceed by an inner induction on the length of its cut-path to show that there is a derivation in which the number of non-anchored origins has decreased. Note that, if the length of this cut-path is 0, then the cut is already anchored and there is nothing to do. Now consider the * cut-instance connected to our origin and make a case analysis on the rule instance r on the right above it.
(1) If r is one of ∧ • , ♦ • , ⊃ • , • , we can reduce as follows:
where the Inv r is eliminated by Proposition 6.14.
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(2) If r is one of ∨ • , ∧ • , we can reduce as follows: where the Inv r steps are eliminated by Proposition 6.14. Note that it can happen in these two cases that the Inv r -step is vacuous in the above because depending on the position of the output formula in Γ{ } it is possible that Γ 
From here, w steps are removed by Proposition 6.13. Left-freeness is preserved since the derivations initially on the right of the cut, D 2 and D 3 , remain on the right of all cuts after the transformation. Finally, both of the new cuts have the same rank as the initial cut, satisfying the requirement in the statement of the lemma. (To see that the application of the c-rule is correct we refer to Observation 2.2 and Definition 2.3.) Note that this case shows that we need an explicit contraction rule. Making contraction implicit in the ⊃ • -rule (as done in [Str13] ) would not be enough, since we also need to duplicate the context Θ{ }.
In the case shown above, the output formula in the conclusion can be in Γ{ } or Θ{ }. There is another such case for ⊃ • on the right branch, where the output formula in the conclusion is in ∆{ }. That case is simpler, and no extra contraction is needed: 
Here we use invertibility of ⊃ • on the right (Proposition 6.14). (4) If r is one of • , ♦ • , t • , t • , c, or one of the s4-rules, working entirely in the context of the cut formula A • , then there are contexts Γ ′ , Γ ′ 1 such that we can reduce as follows:
where, read top-down, the two w-steps weaken as much as is necessary to unify the contexts in order to perform a cut-step. The r-step then acts on the appropriate redex (as determined by the r-step on the left) before contraction is performed to eliminate any formulae duplicated as a result of the permutation. The w-steps are then removed by Proposition 6.13. (5) If r is a s4
• step moving the cut formula (which is of shape A • ), then we can inductively apply, (6) If r is a c step duplicating the cut formula, we can reduce as follows: Note that the number of origins is not increased because the derivation is left-free. Furthermore, we can choose the order of the two new cuts such that the origin we are working on belongs to the topmost cut. Thus, we can proceed by the induction hypothesis. where the w on the left is not needed if (∆ 3 {∅}) ⇓ = (∆ 3 { Σ n }) ⇓ . Note that this case can be seen as a special case of case 4 above. where D ′ 2 exists because our original derivation is left-free, and the w-step is removed by Proposition 6.13. Note that it can happen that (Σ{∅}) ⇓ = (Σ{A • }) ⇓ and/or (∆{∅}) ⇓ = (∆{B • }) ⇓ , depending on where the output formula occurs in Γ{Σ{∅}, ∆{∅}}. Above, we have only shown the cases for cut. The ones for ♦cut and cut are similar, except the ones when r is one of
When such a rule is on the right above a cut, we decompose that cut into a s4 • and a cut (using Fact 6.6) and then apply Lemma 6.5 to permute the s4 • over r, so that we can proceed as described above. When the cut is permuted over r, we can compose it again with the s4 • -instance, so that we can proceed by induction hypothesis. Observe that we make crucial use of the left-free property. Without it, the number of origins in G(D) would not be stable. Furthermore, note that the cut-cut permutation does not affect cuts that are above our current origin. Thus, all origins above remain anchored. This is the reason for starting with the topmost one. 
